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1. Introduction
Extreme events like hurricanes, flooding and earthquakes cause massive disruption to society,
including large death tolls and property damage. In recent years, many events like the
Katrina disaster Katrina (2004) have shown the importance of efficient disaster management
to alleviate the resulting pain and suffering and to mitigate the consequences of the disaster.
Disaster management includes a large set of activities including the care of the survivors
needs, protection of assets from any further damage and provision of shelter, water, food,
and medicines to dislocated people. The creation of an effective disaster supply chain to
deliver necessary goods to disaster relief organizations is an essential function of disaster
management. This function is also called humanitarian logistics. Humanitarian logistics is
a wide term that covers the operations concerning supply chain strategies, processes, and
technologies that will maintain the flow of goods and material needed for the humanitarian.
The management of the supply chain in disaster relief operations is considered an essential
element in the resolution of a crisis since the Tsunami in South East Asia (December, 26th
2004) and the Katrina Hurricane (August, 2005). The scale of these disasters is huge both in
geographical size and in severity. The Katrina Hurricane affected 92,000 square miles of land
Gardner (2006) and hundreds of thousands of people were displaced from their homes.
In a recent report Fritz (2005), it was highlighted that most of the organizations involved in the
2004 tsunami disaster were lacking in supply chain expertise and technology. Humanitarian
logistics is indeed a very challenging task for many organizations for a number or reasons,
which will be described in this chapter. For example, natural disasters are usually
characterized by a chaotic environment and by a general lack of transportation infrastructures,
which are usually degraded or destroyed. Many different organizations may be involved with
no a-priori coordination plan defined. All these challenges make the task of humanitarian
relief organizations very difficult. Traditional mechanisms and processes implemented in
commercial supply chains may not be directly adapted to humanitarian logistics because of
these challenges and because of the different operational requirements. Timing constraints
are much more severe in disaster supply chain than commercial supply chains because of the
potential loss in human lives and assets if essential equipment is not distributed in time.
In other cases, specific processes and technologies can be tailored to humanitarian logistics.
Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology has already been identified as a powerful
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enabler to improve tracking and tracing in supply chain management. RFID is a device
applied to a person or goods for identification and tracking purposes through radio waves.
RFID could be used to create a “virtual infrastructure”, which can be used to track cargo and
goods and their delivery.
Security is a very important requirement in humanitarian logistics. In the aftermath of a
disaster, many goods (e.g., medicine, foods), which are usually available in normal conditions,
became extremely valuable and potential target of thieves.
In the commercial domain, theft reduction is considered the main expected benefit as it
translates to cost savings, while it will be even more important in crisis situation where
replacements for stolen goods, may not be readily available. As a consequence, the distributed
goods must be protected and all the components of the supply chain should be made secure:
RFID tags must not be tampered with and they should be resistant to security attacks (e.g.,
spoofing, eavesdropping and cloning) to ensure that the supply chain is not disrupted by
criminals and that cargo and goods are not stolen. As a consequence, security of the RFID
tags is an important element in humanitarian logistics.
This chapter will describe the main features and challenges of Humanitarian logistics, the
role of RFID technology in disaster supply chains and the implementation and deployment of
secure RFID.
The chapter has the following structure: section 2 describes the features of natural disasters
and emergency crises, the main phases (mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery), the
role of Humanitarian Logistics and the related challenges. Section 3 describes the role of RFID
in Humanitarian Logistics. Section 4 describes security aspects in RFID. Section 5 describes
the proposed system for secure RFID and the related authentication mechanism. Section
6 describes the system architecture and the deployment of RFID in humanitarian logistics.
Section 7 describes the role of telecommunications in the disaster supply chains based on
RFID. Finally section 8 provides suggestions for future developments in this area.
2. Disaster management and humanitarian logistics
2.1 Type of disasters and features
In this chapter, we will use the definition of natural disaster from Bankoff (2005):
“a natural disaster is the effect of a natural hazard (e.g., flood, tornado, volcano
eruption, earthquake or landslide) that affects the environment, and leads to financial,
environmental and/or human losses. The resulting loss depends on the capacity of the
population to support or resist the disaster, and their resilience”
it appears clear that what is relevant is the effect of the disaster on the human lives and
activities in the affected area.
Natural disasters and emergency crises can have different types of classification based on their
features. One main classification is natural and man-made disasters. Natural disasters are
the consequences of natural hazards like earthquakes, flooding, avalanche or tsunami while
man-made disasters are caused by human actions (e.g., terrorist attack) or human oversight.
Other taxonomies are based on the predictability of the event or the impact on the region.
Table 1 provides an overview of the most typical disasters or emergency crises and their
features from a qualitative point of view.
Each type of disaster have specific features, which require different responses and recovery
actions, but they all produce devastating loss of lives and assets. Disaster management tries
to minimize the impact of natural disasters through various activities, which include damage
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Disaster Type Predictability Severity Geographical
impact
Earthquake Low High National
Tsunami Low High International
Storm/Hurricane Medium Medium/High National
Vulcanic Eruption Medium High National and
International (i.e.,
dust clouds)
Pandemic Disease Medium Medium/High Potentially Global
Terrorist Attack Medium Medium Local/City
Transportation
incident
Low Medium Local
Armed Conflict Medium High International
Landslide Medium Low Local
Avalanche Medium Low Local
Chemical plant
incident
Man-made Low Medium
Nuclear incident Low High National and
International (i.e.,
radioactive dust)
Table 1. Features of natural disasters and emergency crisis
assessment, reconstruction, emergency health services and the creation of supply chains to
bring needed goods.
2.2 Phases of disaster management
Natural disaster management is usually split in four phases: prevention, preparedness,
response and recovery. Such phases may be named in different way by different authors
or different organizations, but usually the first two phases are related to activities to avoid
the disaster (prevention) or to be prepared for the disaster (preparedness). The third phase
(response) includes all the activities to be performed in the aftermath of a disaster, while the
last phase (recovery) deals with the endeavor of bringing back a normal life to the people
affected by the disaster.
From Altay and Green (2006), a number of activities are defined for each phase of disaster
management, which are described in figure 1.
2.3 Supply chains in disaster management
The availability of materials such as medicines, food, shelter for the immediate needs after
the disaster is usually not a problem and it is also quite viable to deliver them in the country
affected by the disaster; what is a real challenge is to keep track of the shipped crates and
ensure that medicines are distributed to the hospitals and the responders working in the
disaster sites. Operators deploying the Supply Chain in disaster areas have to face, on
top of the heavy disruption of the usual delivery systems as well as of the communication
systems, the presence of every sort of looters; in the aftermath of a disaster, the usual physical
protection of a sensitive area, such as a warehouse, may be limited. As a consequence,
it is of paramount importance that the tools used to keep track of the delivered crates
are well designed against tampering. The management of the supply chain is one of the
most important activities during a natural disaster or an emergency crisis and an adequate
preparation is the key for success in such phase, but it is obviously very difficult to invest
large amount of money in the preparation of a response to events that may or may not
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Fig. 1. Phases of Disaster Management
occur, therefore it is crucial to design a solution that is tamper proven, low cost and user
friendly. The role of the logistics and the supply chain has also been highlighted by recent
events. In the immediate aftermath of the 2004 Asian Tsunami, relief goods flooded airports
and warehouses in the affected regions, aid agencies struggled to sort through, store and
distribute the piles of supplies while disposing of those that were inappropriate. In Sri Lanka,
the airports were overloaded by the large number of humanitarian cargo flights. At the
distribution level, relief agencies struggled to identify warehouses to store excess inventory.
In India, the transportation infrastructure was overloaded and bottlenecks were present at
main conjunction points. In Indonesia, the damaged infrastructure combined with the flood
of goods from many different agencies created huge logistics problems. Many participants to
the relief efforts to the Tsunami disaster, claimed that logistics and efficient supply chain was
more important than a large quantity of goods. Figure 1 describes the phases in disaster
management and the related functions. Supply chains used in disaster management are
usually called disaster supply chains.
Supply chain management for business applications had a long evolution and many
companies have well established supply chains around the world but the strategic goal of
commercial supply chains and disaster supply chains is different. Commercial supply chains
are focused on quality and profitability, humanitarian supply chains must be focused on
minimizing loss of life and suffering. Supply chain management may be present in the phases
preparedness, response and recovery with different roles. In the preparedness phase, supply
chains are used to stockpile and maintain disaster supplies and equipment, which may be
used in disaster management. In preparedness phase, the management of the supply chain is
relatively easy as the location of the stockpiling facilities and inventories is well known and
the transfer of the materials is planned in advance. In the response phase, supply chains
are an essential element in the resolution of the crisis. Depending on the features of the
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crisis as described in Table 1, supply chain management can become very complex with the
presence of different stakeholders and large quantity of materials to be distributed. Because
transportation infrastructures are degraded or destroyed, the distribution of the materials
could be quite difficult. Furthermore, there are severe time constraints as people may die
if goods are not distributed in time. In the recovery phase, disaster supply chains are needed
to rebuild destroyed property and repair of essential critical infrastructures (e.g., energy,
transportation and others). Supply chain management can still be hampered by degraded
infrastructure in the area, but the timing constraints are usually more relaxed in comparison
to the response phase.
Fig. 2. Participants to Humanitarian Logistics
Another significant challenge for humanitarian logistics is the presence of many different
types of organizations: from firefighters, military, relief organizations, non-government
organizations (NGO) and others. The coordination among these organizations is essential
to support disaster management operations and disaster supply chains in particular. Figure 2
describes the main participants, which are usually involved in the resolution of a large natural
disaster or emergency crisis.
Technology can be essential in improving disaster supply chain management and in providing
more capabilities to the partners involved in the resolution of the crisis.
One of the basic ingredients of supply chain management is information. Supply chain
managers need to know what is the demand of the goods, where they are located at any
time, when and where they will be shipped and so on. These tasks are already complex
in generic commercial supply chains, but in humanitarian logistics they become even more
difficult because many different partners are involved, which must share information among
themselves in the severe time constraints imposed by the operational context. Interoperability
issues may especially appear in unplanned situations.
An essential element is the proper identification of the goods and the distribution of this
information to all the involved partners. In natural disasters, goods may come from any type
of sources, because aid-agencies are sometimes not equipped to tag the material in the proper
4ecure RFID fo  Humanitarian Logistics
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way. Autier (1990) discusses the case of drug supplies, after the 1988 Armenian earthquake,
when at least 5000 tons of drugs were sent by international relief operations but only one
third was usable because it is was properly identified, relevant for the emergency situation
and distributed in time. One fifth of the supplies had to be destroyed at the end of 1989.
One important aspect is security. As described in the challenges above, criminal entities may
take advantage of the chaotic conditions to steal or redirect goods to the wrong destination.
The information present in the supply chain management systems must be secured and
protected so that it cannot be used for criminal purposes. Technology can improve the access,
distribution and security of the information in a number of ways.
3. Application of RFID to disaster supply chains
3.1 RFID technology
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is said to be the future technology to improve and
optimize supply chain management systems. In comparison to traditional bar codes, RFID
technology provides better data security, does not need line of sight because it is based on
radio propagation, provide computational capability, improve automation and thus enhances
the operational efficiency of supply chains Lin (2009). Figure 3 shows the differences with
barcode technology: RFID allows to write information on the tag without line of sight as they
are based on radio propagation and they provide computational capability, which can be used
to implement security features. Typical components of RFID systems are RFID tags attached
to the assets, reading/writing devices, and back-end systems.
RFID tags are usually very small sized low cost devices which can be easily fixed on physical
objects like asset boxes or even implanted in animals or persons. The interface to control
RFID tags is a short range wireless link. The simplest tags just send a unique identification
number (UID) on request. More sophisticated tags offer several bits to severals bytes of read
and write memory. High end RFID tags are equipped with a computing device to execute
tasks like cryptographic algorithms for authentication or encryption. Beside the classification
concerning the feature set of RFID tags there are basically two possibilities for the power
supply of RFID tags: passive and active. Passive tags harvest the energy received from the
reader through the antenna and using that energy to power the device. Passive tags are
less expensive than active tags, which include their own power supply like a battery. The
battery powered tags offer the possibility to execute tasks while not connected to a reader. For
example perishable goods may be monitored by active tags that integrate with thermometers
to ensure the goods are kept at an acceptable temperature.
Devices for accessing RFID tags are called RFID readers. RFID readers can either be fixed
devices with antennas mounted at points where assets pass by (e.g., reader gates) or readers
can be handheld devices available for several operational environments. Some handheld
devices are even equipped with a wireless communication link to access the back-end system.
In the back-end system all the RFID data is aggregated, stored, and provided to the supply
chain management. The main component of the back-end system is the RFID middleware
which connects the reader infrastructure to databases and supply chain management tools.
3.2 Track and trace based on RFID
Systems based on RFID technology provide the track and trace capability to monitor the
movement of tagged items from the suppliers to the emergency crisis through distribution
channels. figure 4 shows the typical supply chain based on RFID technology. The crates
carrying the necessary assets are equipped with RFID tags, which are read at every point
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Fig. 3. Barcode and RFID
Fig. 4. Supply chains based on RFID technology
within the supply chain through automated systems equipped with RFID readers. The
identification number provided by the RFID tag has to be unique for each item. The reading
device aggregates the tag ID with its own ID and sent the data set to a central tracking server
in a control center. Both fixed readers and mobile readers can be used to track the assets with
RFID tags. Fixed readers are usually installed at main goverment and transportation centers
(e.g., ports, airports). Mobile readers can be used by the government and relief agencies in
the field or if the transportation centers themselves are destroyed by the disasters. Mobile
readers may also provide their location through Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)
like GPS. Control centers can use the position provided by the mobile readers to organize the
distributions of goods in a more efficient way. There is the need to have a central tracking
server, which stores the complete history of the RFID tags across all the disaster supply chain.
4ecure RFID fo  Humanitarian Logistics
www.intechopen.com
8 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
Various relief organizations and their own ICT systems can connect with the central tracking
server to retrieve the information on the distributed goods as shown in figure 5. Currently
the most promising approach for a track and trace solution is the Electronic Product Code
(EPC) infrastructure. Designed and standardized by EPCglobal EPCGlobal (2003) it enables
the exchange of RFID data using Internet protocols.
Fig. 5. Tracking system
At a first glance such a track and trace system seems to be a good approach, but there are some
drawbacks. A precondition for track and trace techniques to work reliably is that each party
involved in the distribution process must take part to the track and trace system. On the one
hand all participants of the supply chain must be compliant with the chosen track and trace
standard and they must also provide a consistent tracking data. This requires cooperation
among all partners within the multi party supply chain. On the other hand in emergency
crises the communication infrastructure can be degraded or even destroyed as consequence
of the crisis itself. Hence, the item cannot be tracked along the complete supply chain in order
to securely identify the object.
As written in the previous sections, security is an essential requirement. Ordinary RFID
tags, with no security features, which are commonly used in commercial supply chains are
simple tags, which only store an identification number in plain text. As a consequence the
tags themselves can be susceptible to faking attacks. In addition all necessary information on
the functionality of RFID is also available on the Internet or in the literature, e.g., the RFID
handbook Finkenzeller (2003), as well as development tools. More information on the need
for secure RFID in disaster supply chains in provided in section 5.1.
4. RFID security
Like other wireless technologies, RFID is vulnerable to a wide range of security threats, which
have been identified in literature.
In Tanenbaum et al (2006), the authors identify the following threats to RFID technology:
1. Sniffing or eavesdropping, where RFID tags are read without the knowledge of the tag
bearer. Even if RFID is a short-range wireless technology, RFID tag reading my happen
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also at large distances using RFID readers equipped with directional antennas and power
amplifiers.
2. Spoofing. Spoofing attacks supply false information that looks valid and that the system
accepts. Attackers can create authentic RFID tags by writing properly formatted tag data
on blank or rewritable RFID transponders.
3. Tracking. RFID readers in strategic locations can record sightings of unique tag identifiers.
4. Denial of service. Denial of Service (DoS) is when RFID systems are prevented from
functioning properly. Tag reading can be hindered by Faraday cages or Signal jamming,
both of which prevent radio waves from reaching RFID-tagged objects
5. Replay attack where a valid RFID signal is intercepted and its data is recorded; this data is
later transmitted to a reader where it is played back. Because the data appears valid, the
system accepts it.
6. Cloning where a RFID tag is duplicated with the same information.
Some of these RFID security threats are relevant to disaster supply chains. For example
sniffing can be used to extract the information on the contents of the crates to understand
if they contain valuables goods. By using long distance sniffers, malicious parties can collect
the information on the distributed goods, without being detected by authorities, and plan a
subsequent phyisical attack to steal valuable material. By using RFID replay attacks, thieves
can make the theft more efficient. In a first phase, thieves intercept a valid RFID signal. Then
they replace the crates and they use the replayed signal to mislead the RFID reader owned by
the authorities. In another example, malicious parties can track the flow of goods of specific
types to improve the planning for a subsequent theft.
While sniffing is relatively easy to implement, other RFID threats are more complex to
implement and malicious parties may use them only for very valuable goods. For example
Tanenbaum et al (2006) introduces a new type of RFID threat called RFID malware, where
malicious software carried by an infected RFID tag can "‘infect"’ the backend of a RFID IT
infrastructure during the reading phase. This type of attack is more complex to implement
and may be limited to the commercial domain.
Security issues in the context of supply chain management has been investigated in Li and
Ding (2007), which identifies the specific security requirements in supply chains and propose
a practical design of RFID communication protocols that satisfy the security requirements.
5. Secure RFID in humanitarian logistics
5.1 Need for secure RFID
As described in the previous sections, a major issue in natural disasters and emergency crises
is security.
Criminals like thieves and looters may take advantage of the chaotic environment to steal
goods or to disrupt the supply chain to their advantage Cassidy (2003). In a natural disaster,
the goods (medicines, food) brought by aid agencies and relief organizations are even more
valuable because of their scarcity. In all disaster situations, there is the potential for loss
through theft at all levels of the supply chain, and control systems must be established and
supervised at all storage, hand-over and distribution points to minimize this risk. Even more
dangerous of simple thieving is tampering: the use of unreliable medicines or rotten food
can further endanger the life of the survivors, therefore it is crucial to be able to keep track
of the origin of the goods along each step of their delivery. Security of the relief chains is
4ecure RFID fo  Humanitarian Logistics
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an important requirement in humanitarian logistics. Consequently, all the components of the
supply chain should be made secure: RFID devices must not be tampered with and they
should be resistant to security attacks (e.g., spoofing, eavesdropping and cloning) to ensure
that the supply chain is not disrupted by criminals and that cargo and goods are not stolen.
Since ordinary RFID tags used for track and trace solutions are simple tags which only store
an identification number in plain text the tags themselves are susceptible to faking attacks.
It is a misbelief that tags which carry a unique identifier written during the manufacturing
process can be used as security feature for unique identification. Usually RFID systems use
standardized radio frequency communication protocols which are public domain. In addition
all necessary information on the functionality of RFID is also available on the internet or in
the literature, e.g. the RFID handbook (see Finkenzeller (2003)), as well as development tools.
Cloning an original tag is not difficult with the proper tools.
Is the RFID is not secure, the following scenario is possible: A criminal party, duplicates tags
as described and attaches them to goods. The shipping unit carrying the original RFID may
be removed from the supply chain and sold using an illegal distribution channel. The goods
carrying the cloned tags move within the supply chain without producing any inconsistence
in the tracking history. In the worst case terrorists could replace drugs or food by worthless
or even harmful units to sabotage disaster relief.
This chapter will analyze practical utilization of this type of device in the resolution of
emergency crises to guarantee the reliability of sealing of the goods and their identification.
The establishment of a logistics tracking framework based on secure RFID has the potential to
greatly increase the effectiveness of future emergency crises response operations.
Track and trace systems using RFID allow to track the movement of tagged items from the
suppliers to the emergency crisis through distribution. Each item is equipped with an RFID
tag that can be read out automatically without any line-of-sight at every point within the
supply chain. The read data provides detailed information on the corresponding item and
it will then be sent via the internet to the central tracking server which stores the complete
history of the RFID tag and checks its plausibility. Providing this electronic pedigree of each
transport unit the barrier to disrupt the supply chain can be increased. Figure 5 shows
the tracking system. For instance, the Electronic Product Code (=EPC) infrastructure by
EPCglobal (see EPCGlobal (2003)) enables the exchange of RFID data via the internet and
it is currently the most promising approach for a track and trace solution.
5.2 Cryptographic authentication
A track and trace only solution may not be sufficient for a secure identification of items.
To obtain an appropriate security level that ensures authentication on item level, the RFID
tags themselves must implement authentication mechanisms (see also Staake (2005)). This
authentication mechanism must withstand the cloning attack as described in the previous
sections. The approach is the commonly used challenge response protocol. The RFID tag contains
its identification number, a secret key and a cryptographic unit. The reader transmits a
randomly selected number, the so-called challenge and the tag calculates the corresponding
response with the cryptographic algorithm using the secret key and the challenge. Then the tag
sends this response back to the reader. Finally the reader, respectively the back end system,
checks whether the response is correct or not. Note that the secret key itself is not transmitted
over the radio channel and the correct response can only be generated with the aid of the
secret key.
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5.3 Public key authentication
A weakness of symmetric cryptography used in most of RFID system is that the tag and the
reader share a common key to run the authentication protocol: the tag uses this secret key
for response generation and the reader for the verification. This approach requires that the
readers must store the secret keys of the RFID tags belonging to the application domain or an
on-line connection from the reader to a server must be established to store the secret keys of
the RFID tags in a secure and reliable back end system.
In public-key cryptography, the response generation is performed using a secret key, the
so-called private key privid, but the response verification on the reader side can be performed
without any secret key onlywith a public key pubid, which needn’t be protected against misuse.
In order to avoid that each reader has to store the individual public keys pubid of all tags
belonging to the application, a Certification Authority (CA) issues a certificate certid for every
public key pubid and only the CA knows the secret signature key (=PrivSigKey) necessary
for the generation of the certificate. The corresponding public signature key (=PubSigKey)
for verifying the certificates must be downloaded exactly one time to each reader within the
system.
The authentication flow is following:
• the tag transmits its certificate certid containing its public key pubid.
• the reader verifies the authenticity of the sent public key pubid with the public signature
key.
• a challenge-response-protocol will be initialized. The reader generates a challenge C,
transmits C to the tag upon which the tag computes the corresponding response R with its
private key privid using the public key operation.
• The tag sends R back to the reader and finally the reader checks the response with the tag’s
public key pubid using the verification algorithm.
.
The major benefits of this approach are that:
• no secret key is needed for the authentication on the reader side, neither in the back end
nor in the reader itself.
• the authentication process can be performed without any online connection which
simplifies the system.
The disadvantage of the public key approach is the higher complexity in comparison to the
symmetric key approach, which means a higher implementation effort in chip size and finally
a lower performance and higher power consumption. Low-cost RFID tag based on elliptic
curve cryptography (=ECC) are proposed inWolkerstorfer (2005). Batina (2006) gave a further
area optimization using a protocol based on zero knowledge.
5.4 Authentication protocol
An efficient authentication protocol for RFID tags is based on elliptic curves over binary finite
fields GF(2n). An elliptic curve E is a set of points P = (xP, yP) satisfying the Weierstraß
equation y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b where a, b ∈ GF(2n). On an elliptic curve E one can define
an addition R = (xR, yR) = P + Q of elliptic curve points P = (xP, yP) and Q = (xQ, yQ) by
5ecure RFID fo  Humanitarian Logistics
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the following formulae:
P 6= Q P = Q
xR = λ
2 + λ + xP + xQ + a xR = λ
2 + λ + a
yR = λ(xP + xR) + xR + yP yR = x
2
P + (λ + 1)xR
λ =
yP + yQ
xP + xQ
λ = xP +
yP
xP
The structure determined by the set of points and this addition operation allows public key
operation which is the scalar multiplication s ∗ P of a scalar value s in binary representation
s = (sℓ, . . . , s1)2 with a point P = (xP, yP) on the curve E. An in deep introduction
to this field of cryptography may be found in Hankerson (2004). The so-called elliptic
curve point multiplication is the basis for our protocol. We implemented Montgomery’s
method for scalar multiplication Bock (2008); Hankerson (2004). This method has special
characteristics preventing so-called side channel attacks and it is well suited for hardware
efficient implementations since expensive inversions of finite fields elements can be avoided
as projective coordinates of the x-coordinates are used Hankerson (2004).
The applied authentication protocol is based on a challenge-response-protocol, where the
security is based on the Elliptic-Curve-Diffie-Hellman problem.
Now let P denote the base point on the elliptic curve E with order q. For each RFID tag an
individual private key privid is given, which is a random number d with 0 < d < q. The
corresponding public key pubid is then the point Q given by the scalar multiplication of d and
the base point P:
Q := d ∗ P
As already pointed out in the previous section the RFID reader generates a challenge C. This
will be done by choosing a random scalar k and multiplying it with P:
C := k ∗ P
The corresponding response R is then calculated by the tag using its private key d:
R := d ∗ C
The reader itself calculates V := k ∗ Q and checks if R = V. The verification works since the
following chain of equations holds:
R = d ∗ C = d ∗ (k ∗ P) = (dk) ∗ P = k ∗ (d ∗ P) = k ∗ Q = V
The complete authentication protocol is depicted in Figure 6.
6. System architecture
The application of secure RFID to Humanitarian logistics is depicted in figure 7.
The deployment of this system is based on the following steps:
1. In the first step of the disaster supply chain, the Certification Authority (CA) generates
the key pars and store them in the RFID tags. This step has to be executed in a
trustworthy environment; for example a logistic center of an humanitarian organization
or a government agency. The CA is a server system which stores the private signature key
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certid
C
R
compute R := d ∗ C
RFID Reader
stores public signature key
to verify the tag’s certificate
verify certificate certid
pick random k
compute C := k ∗ P
compute V := k ∗ Q
if V = R accept tag
else reject
RFID Tag
stores private key d
and certificate certid
containing the public key Q
Fig. 6. The RFID Authentication Protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography
PrivSigKey which has to be kept secret by the CA because this key is the cryptographic
security anchor of the whole system. The associated public signature key PubSigKey may
be publicly known and part of the CA certificate.
2. Certificates must be distributed to the main stakeholders as described in figure 8 to be
installed on RFID readers (both fixed and mobile). Certificates can also be distributed in
the mitigation phase using secure links over Internet or through secure communication
links (e.g., VPN).
3. Then the RFID tags are applied to the relief goods, which are then transported to the
disaster areas.
4. Relief agencies and other organizations can use the fixed and mobile RFID readers to track
and trace the relief goods through all the nodes of the disaster supply chain. It is important
that only trusted certificates are allowed to be installed on the readers.
5. At the disaster area the emergency responders may use handheld devices equipped with
RFID readers to read the attached RFID tags, verify their authenticity and finally distribute
the goods.
The proposed solution can be used to augment existing supply chains and it has a minimal
impact on the organization structure and procedures of the relief organizations.
Figure 8 describes the deployment workflow of the proposed solution among the participants
of the disaster supply chain.
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Disaster Supply Chain
Certification Authority (CA) PrivSigKey, PubSigKey
Disaster AreaRFID Supported Distribution
of Relief Items
Fixed and Mobile RFID Readers Mobile Readers
Distribution of PubSigKey at Reader Initialization
privid
certid
Relief Items
Blank
RFID Tags
Personalization of Items
in a Trustworthy Environment
Fig. 7. Proposed system architecture for RFID secured relief item distribution
7. Communication infrastructure for humanitarian logistics
In order to fully exploit the capabilities of the RFID based Supply Chain Management, such
system must be supported by an efficient and secure communication system as well as
by a distributed data base management system. In a disaster area, most communications
will be wireless because first responders need high mobility and because the fixed line
infrastructure can be unavailable, e.g. destroyed, damaged or overloaded. The security of
the communication link between the RFID tag and the reader/writer is described in another
part of this paper, but it is very important to consider that any system is as secure as its
weakest component; therefore the communication link between the reader/writer and its
local or remote controller has to be considered and made secure. In order to make the system
usable, it is very important to consider that the remote stations should be allowed to work
without an always-on connection because it is unthinkable to have such connection available
all the time. In the following we will provide a broad description of communication systems
that could be implemented in a disaster situation to support the Supply Chain exploiting
the security features described in the previous chapters. From the logical point of view,
the logistic of the disaster supply chains is very similar to the Logistic of any Commercial
Supply Chain, therefore we can assume that the basic concepts and the basic infrastructure
remain the same, but few key features must be redesigned in order to cope with the peculiar
operational environment of the Disaster Relief Operations. The first aspect to address is the
lack of standard communication infrastructures (GSM/UMTS/PSTN) where crates of goods
and people have to be dispatched, therefore the ideal situation is that any RFID reader used
to acquire the information on the crates present in any intermediate station (e.g, warehouse)
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Fig. 8. Deployment workflow
in the disaster area is provided with a satellite link to transmit the data to the Logistic Control
Centre as described in Figure 9.
An alternative solution (depicted in Figure 10) could be the establishment of a Wireless
Local Area Network, to collect and manage data locally, connecting with the Central Logistic
Control Center only when required. This solution presents some important pros, namely
the possibility to operate without a permanent link with the logistic centre and a significant
reduction in term of the cost of the communication equipment. The cons are the need to set
up a local logistic control centre and the implementation of a secure client-server mechanism,
between the control centres capable of surviving an unstable connection: usual commercial
software, designed for a reliable "always on" environment may run into troubles facing
frequent loss of connection. Furthermore the WiFi connection must be implemented with
a reasonable level of security to avoid jeopardizing the secure RFIDs. An example of RFID
sensor network for humanitarian logistics based on Zigbee communication technology is
presented in Yang (2010).
In summary, the communication structure needed for such system should take into account
some key issues:
• Distributed databases connected through potentially unreliable communication links
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Fig. 9. RFID readers directly connected to the Logistic control center through Satellite
Communications
Fig. 10. RFID readers connected to a wireless Local Area Networks for local management
• Integrated and redundant communication systems using: a) Direct satellite links; b) Local
wireless coverage (GSM and/or WiMAX and/or WiFi) plus satellite link
• Secure wireless links
• Store and forward protocols
8. Conclusions
The chapter has presented the application of secure RFID technology to the specific domain of
humanitarian logistics. Because security is a important requirements in disaster management,
56 Designing and Deploying RFID Applications
www.intechopen.com
Secure RFID for Humanitarian Logistics 17
we believe that relief organizations can benefit from this technology to ensure that goods are
not stolen or tampered. A potential system architecture has been presented and described.
Because, infrastructures are usually degraded or destroyed in a natural disaster or emergency
crisis, mobile readers and fast deployable communication systems is an important component
in the overall system architecture.
Future developments in this research area would be the integration of these technologies
in the organizational and procedural frameworks of relief and government agencies. As
described in this chapter, a central Certification Authority (CA)must be defined to provide the
certificates, which must be installed in the fixed and mobile portable readers. Furthermore,
an efficient disaster supply chain requires the set-up of a coordinated track and trace system
in the prevention phase of disaster management.
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